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ABSTRACT
Since the float of the Australian dollar in December 1983, the Reserve Bank has
intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to exert a stabilising influence.
Whether this intervention has been stabilising cannot be directly observed since the
behaviour of the exchange rate in its absence cannot be known.  However, there are
a number of ways of assessing it indirectly.  The best known is the Friedman
"profits test".  Friedman (1953) argued that a central bank which was stabilising the
exchange rate would tend to buy foreign exchange when its price was low, and sell
when its price is high, and hence its operations would be profitable.  This paper
applies the profits test to the Bank's foreign exchange operations since the exchange
rate was floated.  The main conclusion is that over this period the Bank's foreign
exchange operations have produced total profits of around $A3.4 billion, suggesting
that intervention has tended to be stabilising.  Other statistical tests developed by
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1. INTRODUCTION
When the Australian dollar was floated in December 1983, the Reserve Bank noted
that it would retain discretion to intervene in the foreign exchange market.  The
Bank's operations in the market were very light for the first 18 months or so of the
float but became more substantial towards the end of 1985.  By the latter half of
1986, the Bank had significantly stepped up its intervention in the face of sharp
downward pressure on the exchange rate.
Since then, the Bank has continued to intervene in the market.  At times this has
involved undertaking relatively small amounts of intervention to slow the movement
in the exchange rate or to slowly rebuild reserves.  At other times, when the
exchange rate had moved a long way from what was perceived to be a sustainable
rate over the longer term, the Bank has sought to prevent further movement or even
reverse some of the earlier movement.1
An obvious question arises:   Has this intervention been successful in having a
stabilising influence on the exchange rate?  This question has no direct answer
because we cannot know how the exchange rate would have behaved in the absence
of the Bank's foreign exchange operations.  As a consequence, we need to turn to
various indirect measures.  Probably the best known and appealing to a participant
in the market is the profits test, first proposed by Milton Friedman in 1953.  Other
tests, which look at deviations of the exchange rate from a long-term trend, have
been suggested by Wonnacott (1982) and by Mayer and Taguchi (1983).
This paper briefly reviews the literature on the effectiveness of foreign exchange
intervention and then applies some of the tests discussed in this literature to the
Reserve Bank's intervention over the floating rate period.  While there can be
                                                                                                                                  
1 For fuller explanations of the Bank's foreign exchange operations, see Fraser (1992) and
Macfarlane (1993).2
shortcomings in the use of profits as a test of effectiveness of intervention, we argue
that the existence of profits over long periods provides a strong case for the view
that central bank intervention has been effective in stabilising the exchange rate.
The paper shows that the Bank has made significant profits over the post-float
period, though, as would be expected, profits have not been made in all sub-periods.
Other tests carried out in this study support the finding that intervention has tended
to stabilise the exchange rate over the period the currency has been floating.
It should be noted that the tests relate to what is often referred to in the literature as
sterilised intervention.  Academic discussion often makes much of the distinction
between sterilised and unsterilised intervention (the latter leading to a change in
financial conditions due to the effect of intervention on the monetary reserves of the
banking system) but in reality central banks virtually always sterilise their
intervention.  To the extent that central banks want to undertake a change in
monetary policy to influence the exchange rate they would do this through their
usual means, which in most cases is operations in the domestic money market,
rather than waiting for it to happen as a by-product of foreign exchange
intervention.2
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses whether profitability can be
used to assess the effectiveness of intervention and examines some of the empirical
results from studies for other countries.  Section 3 gives a broad overview of the
Bank's foreign exchange operations, discusses the data and details our methodology.
Section 4 summarises the empirical results on profitability for Australia.  Section 5
provides some additional evidence, based upon tests first proposed by Wonnacott,
that the Bank's operations have stabilised the exchange rate.  The final section
provides some concluding thoughts.
                                                                                                                                  
2 One reason for this is that intervention only impacts on domestic monetary reserves with a lag,
as foreign exchange transactions are settled two days after being undertaken.  A central bank
whose currency was under threat to such a degree that it would consider raising interest rates
would not want to wait for two days to achieve this monetary tightening through its failure to
sterilise its intervention.3
2. PREVIOUS PROFITABILITY STUDIES
2.1 The Connection Between Profits and Stabilising Intervention
In 1953 Friedman noted that "speculation can be destabilising in general only if
speculators on the average sell when the currency is low in price and buy when it is
high".3  Conversely, profitable speculation would be stabilising because, to make
profits, speculators would need to buy low and sell high, thereby reducing
variability in the exchange rate.  As a central bank intervening in the market acts (in
some respects) much like an ordinary speculator, Friedman suggested that its
success or failure in stabilising the rate be judged on the basis of an ordinary
speculator - "there should be a simple criterion of success - whether the agency
makes or loses money".4
This simple criterion elicited many articles examining the link between profitability
and the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention.  The research focussed on:
(a) the extent to which central bank foreign exchange operations had been
profitable; and
(b) the possibility that profitable intervention may not be stabilising or that
stabilising intervention may not be profitable.
2.2 The Profitability of Intervention
There have been several empirical studies on the profitability of intervention for
major countries.  One of the first was that published by Taylor (1982), which
examined nine industrial countries early in the floating period, from the early 1970s
to the end of 1979.5  According to his estimates, central banks lost more than
$US11 billion over the whole period.  Losses varied substantially for individual
countries and, more importantly, as the period over which the calculation was
carried out was altered.
                                                                                                                                  
3 Friedman (1953), p.175.
4 ibid, p.188.
5 The United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Switzerland and
Spain were included in his study.4
Subsequently, several authors challenged Taylor's results, reworking his calculations
using several refinements.  By lengthening the sample period and taking account of
the interest differential between investing in foreign currencies and the local
currency, Argy (1982), Jacobson (1983), and the Bank of England (1983) found that
these large losses were in fact profits.  For the US, for instance, Jacobson estimated
that losses totalled around $US500 million for the 1973-79 period, but over the
entire 1973-1981 period, net profits amounted to almost $US300 million.
Moreover, including a measure of net interest earnings increased profits by up to
$US470 million over the longer period.
Many of these studies suffered from the fact that they were based on data which
only approximated the exchange rate at which transactions occurred.  For example,
they used published data which were often on an end-of-month basis.  Given
significant intra-month movements in exchange rates, this is not a good basis for
reliable studies, as the rates at which a central bank deals in the market can be very
different from the published series.
A later paper by Leahy (1989) on the profitability of US intervention sought to
reduce some of the aggregation problems by using daily rather than monthly
observations.  Over the entire study period, from 1973 to early 1988, profits
amounted to almost $US5.5 billion when interest income was included and
$US3.8 billion when excluded.  Again, however, Leahy noted the sensitivity of his
calculations to using shorter periods, pointing to sub-periods when the authorities
incurred large losses on intervention operations.
Murray, Zelmer and Williamson (1990) from the Bank of Canada applied Leahy's
basic analysis to the Canadian experience.  Unlike many earlier studies, however,
they used actual data on the amount and the rate at which daily interventions were
undertaken.  Over the full sample, from mid 1975 to mid 1988, profits from
intervention amounted to about $C1.6 billion ($US1.2 billion), with most of that
coming from net interest earnings.  Like other studies, the calculation of profits
varied among sub-periods.  Although profits were relatively large over the period as
a whole, substantial trading losses were realised during some sub-periods.5
2.3 The Relationship Between Profitability and Effectiveness
In making his claim that stabilising intervention would be profitable, Friedman might
have had in mind a situation such as that depicted in Figure 1.  The exchange rate is
expressed here as the price of the foreign currency - i.e. as the amount of domestic
currency required to buy one unit of foreign currency.  This is the way most
countries quote their exchange rate.  A low reading indicates that foreign currency is
cheap (the value of the domestic currency is high) and a high reading indicates that
foreign currency is dear (the value of domestic currency is low).  For those readers
who are used to working mostly with Australian dollar exchange rates, this
definition of the exchange rate may, unfortunately, be confusing as the Australian
dollar is quoted in foreign exchange markets in reciprocal form (e.g. US70 cents per
Australian dollar).  The more widely accepted definition is used in this paper to be
consistent with international usage and to simplify the understanding of the algebra
used later in the study.
In terms of Figure 1, a central bank which bought foreign currency at point A and
sold at point B would make a profit, since it bought when the price was low and
sold when the price was high.  It is also likely that by buying foreign currency at
point A, the central bank would have tempered the domestic currency's appreciation
(so that the exchange rate followed the path traced by the solid line rather than the
dotted line) and, by selling it at point B would have reduced the local currency's
depreciation.





In this example, there is a very clear relationship between profitable and stabilising
intervention.  However, many researchers did not see this as proving that there was
a link between profitable and stabilising intervention.  They went on to examine
cases where there was no relationship between the two.
Some argued that a central bank's operations might be profitable, but have little
impact on the exchange rate and therefore not be stabilising.  Referring again to
Figure 1, this would be the case if the central bank bought at A and sold at B, but
the exchange rate followed the dotted line.  This is theoretically possible, but
unlikely.  While a central bank might be able to conduct its operations in such a low
key way that it would have no impact on the exchange rate, it is hard to think of
reasons why it would do this on a continuing basis, unless its operations were
always aimed at something other than stabilising the exchange rate.
More recent researchers6 have pointed to the possibility that profitable speculation
could lead to more, rather than less, exchange rate variability.  In these models, a
group of speculators is aware that some market participants tend to buy as the price
rises and sell as it falls.  Initially, these "knowledgeable" speculators push the price
away from equilibrium, knowing that the price will move even further away as the
latter group enters the market.  At this point, they turn their positions and the price
moves back towards its equilibrium.  While such a model may reflect the behaviour
of some private speculators, who are trying to induce instability into the rate, it
makes little sense for central banks which are trying to stabilise the rate.  Therefore,
while the situations outlined by these researchers are theoretical possibilities for
private speculators, for all practical purposes they can be put aside.
Others7 argued that a central bank's operations may be stabilising but not be
profitable.  Again, it is not hard to find illustrations of this.  They fall into two broad
categories.  One involves measuring profitability over very short periods.  For
example, if a central bank had bought foreign currency but the price of foreign
currency fell further soon after, then over that time span, those operations would not
have been profitable.  Central banks, however, would not normally judge the
success of their operations over a short time frame.  They would be looking to see
whether their activities had a net stabilising effect over a period as long as an
                                                                                                                                  
6 See Shleifer and Summers (1990).
7 See Bank of England (1983).7
economic cycle;  for example, did it contribute to reducing the degree of
overshooting at the trough and at the peak.  The effectiveness of intervention, and its
profitability, therefore need to be measured over a time frame consistent with the
central bank's objectives.
Second, central banks are not profit maximisers; they do not wait until the exchange
rate reaches the bottom before buying (even if they knew where the bottom was).  A
central bank that was aiming to stabilise its exchange rate would start to buy foreign
currency a long way before the exchange rate reached its probable low point.
Unless the domestic currency immediately stops appreciating when the central bank
starts buying foreign exchange, something which is unlikely, the central bank's
operations are likely to show a loss for some time.  In terms of Figure 1, a central
bank might start to buy foreign currency at point C.  By the time the foreign
currency had depreciated against the domestic currency at point A, those operations
would be showing a loss.  It is not until the price of foreign exchange started to
move back up that the operations would show a profit.  In short, if a central bank
has a longer term objective in mind, the success of those operations can only be
assessed over the span of a complete cycle.  At various points along the cycle,
operations are likely to show a loss, even though they may have been stabilising.
Another situation in which stabilising intervention may not be profitable is if the
exchange rate is on a consistent upward or downward trend.  Drawing on Mayer
and Taguchi, this is illustrated in Figure 2.8  The exchange rate fluctuates around a
downward trend.  A central bank which bought foreign currency at point A and sold
it at point B may be stabilising the exchange rate (in the sense of reducing the
variation around the trend) but those operations would not be profitable as the rate
at which the currency was bought would be higher than the rate at which it was
sold.
                                                                                                                                  
8 See Mayer and Taguchi (1983), Diagram 3 on page 15.8






Various researchers, however, have pointed out that in the circumstances outlined
above, if profitability calculations take into account not only the trading profits on
foreign exchange operations but also the differences in net interest earnings as a
result of the switch from foreign to domestic assets (or vice versa), then the
relationship between stabilising foreign exchange operations and profitable
operations could be restored.
Taking account of net interest earnings will in most cases add to the profitability of
central bank intervention as long as there is some tendency towards uncovered
interest parity, i.e. as long as interest rates on the depreciating currency tend to be
higher - on average - than on the appreciating currency.  For example, if the central
bank whose currency is depreciating sells foreign currency to buy its own currency,
it would increase interest earnings on its assets as it moved from foreign to domestic
assets.  Similarly, for a country whose currency is appreciating, central bank
purchases of foreign currency would result in trading losses in the short term but
higher interest earnings.  Instances where intervention has a negative effect on net
interest earnings are confined mainly to periods when the domestic currency is
appreciating due to tight monetary policy and the central bank is intervening to slow
the appreciation.9
In summary, we would conclude from the results of the available research that,
while there can be instances where stabilising intervention is not profitable and
profitable intervention is not stabilising, it is likely that they would be exceptions
rather than the rule.  Such cases tend to occur when measurement is over a period
that is relatively short or when the exchange rate has a strong trend over the long
term.  In the latter case, allowing for net interest earnings can help.  In general,
however, particularly when measured over reasonably long periods (covering at
least one complete economic cycle) evidence that foreign exchange operations are
profitable would suggest that those operations are also stabilising.  On this analysis,
the profit criterion as set out by Friedman remains a reasonable test of the
effectiveness of central bank foreign exchange operations in stabilising the exchange
rate.
3. THE PROFITABILITY OF RESERVE BANK INTERVENTION
3.1 Overview of the Bank's Operations
The Bank's operations in the foreign exchange market can be thought of as
comprising two main components.  The first is pure intervention, over which the
Bank has discretion as regards to size and timing.  The second is client business,
which consists of meeting the foreign exchange needs of its clients, principally the
Commonwealth Government.9  The timing and size of sales to clients is determined
by the clients themselves, and therefore might be thought of as not at the Bank's
discretion.  However, the Bank chooses when to enter the market to restore the
reserves of foreign exchange it has sold to clients.  The second leg of the client
business is therefore at the Bank's discretion.10  Because client business involves a
discretionary element, it should therefore be added together with pure intervention
                                                                                                                                  
9 There is a third form of Reserve Bank operation in the foreign exchange market which involves
changing the foreign currency position of reserves.  For example, the Bank may sell US dollars
to buy yen.  Since these transactions are in "third currencies", i.e. they do not involve an
Australian dollar leg, they do not affect the value of the Australian dollar and are not included
in these calculations.
10 If the Bank chose to purchase in the market, at the time of receiving the client order, the exact
amount of the order, then the Bank would exert no discretionary effect on the market.  The
outcome would be the same as if the client had gone directly to the market to meet its foreign
exchange needs.10
to calculate the total effect of the Bank's actions on the exchange rate.  All the
following calculations are based on figures which aggregate the two components.
Figure 3 shows the Bank's net purchases of foreign currency in the market and the
net amount of foreign currency sold to the Government in each financial year  since
the float.  Both are defined as positive numbers to facilitate comparison between the
Bank's transactions in the market and client needs.  Only in two years - 1988/89 and
1990/91 - did transactions in the market offset client needs.  In the early post-float
period, the Bank sold foreign currency in the market and sold to the Government.
The consequential fall in reserves was reversed in the late 1980s when purchases in
the market ran well ahead of sales to the Government.  In more recent years, the
Bank has reverted to being a seller both in the market and to the Government.11
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Figure 4 shows the cumulative net foreign currency position of the Bank resulting
from its transactions with the market and with clients since the float.  It is measured
in terms of US dollars - a positive number shows the Bank has bought more foreign
currency from the market and/or its clients than it has sold.  As noted, in the three
                                                                                                                                  
11 Note that in 1993/94, the government was a net seller of  foreign currency to the Bank,
reflecting its program of swapping Australian dollar liabilities into US dollar liabilities.11
years immediately following the float, the Bank was a net seller of foreign currency
with the "short" position reaching around $US7 billion by the latter half of 1986.
Soon after, the Bank switched to being a purchaser of foreign currency reflecting,
first, a desire to rebuild reserves, and then intervention aimed at resisting the extent
of the Australian dollar appreciation.  By late 1988, the Bank's net foreign currency
position had returned to square.  The position fluctuated around zero for a time,
before the sharp depreciation of the Australian dollar around the end of 1991 saw
the Bank's sales of foreign exchange increase significantly.  As at end-June 1994,
the Bank had a cumulative "short" position totalling $US14.8 billion.
These calculations of the Bank's foreign exchange position only reflect the
'discretionary' element, i.e. the purchases and sales of foreign exchange.
Throughout the period, however, there was another important influence at work,
namely, the earnings on official reserves.  These amounted to around $US8 billion
in total and accrued continuously over the period.  The dotted line in Figure 4 shows
what the total foreign exchange position would be if these inflows were included.
For the purposes of calculation of profit and loss, however, it is the 'discretionary'
element given by the solid line that is important.
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3.2 Methodology and Data
3.2.1 Sample Period and Data
This study uses data on the actual deals undertaken by the Bank (volumes and
exchange rates).  The sample period runs daily from 12 December 1983 to
30 June 1994.
The bulk of the Bank's intervention involves buying or selling US dollars against the
Australian dollar on a spot basis;  as a consequence, the analysis measures foreign
exchange transactions in US dollars.12  Where the Bank undertook a transaction
with either the market or a client that involved the exchange of Australian dollars for
a foreign currency other than the US dollar, this was recalculated in equivalent
US dollars using an appropriate exchange rate.  In some cases this was the actual
foreign currency/US dollar exchange rate at which the deal was undertaken as deals
are often crossed through the US dollar.  Where the foreign currency/US dollar rate
was not known for individual transactions it was proxied using the average
exchange rate at which other deals were carried out on that day, or if that was not
available, the exchange rate at 4.00 pm on that day.  Outright forward transactions
were rare throughout the period, though where they were identified, the forward rate
was adjusted for the effect of interest rate differentials to arrive at a comparable spot
rate.
3.2.2 Net Interest Income
As noted above, many argue that a full assessment of the profitability of foreign
exchange intervention requires that the effect on net interest income be taken into
account.  Since it is a cost of holding one currency instead of another, it is clearly
one of the variables which determines profitability.  On the other hand, it can be
argued that the effects on net interest income are purely incidental for a central bank
which aims to exert a stabilising influence on its exchange rate.  They should not, in
any way, impinge upon the decision of whether to intervene, and therefore, should
be excluded from the profit calculation.  This argument has some merit to the extent
that profits should not affect a decision to intervene.
                                                                                                                                  
12 Spot transactions are settled within 2 business days from the day they are arranged; forward
deals are those transactions which are arranged more than 2 business days before settlement.13
In our view, there is not a clear answer to the question of whether interest earnings
should be included in profit calculations.  To our knowledge, most central banks
intervene with the main objective of stabilising their exchange rate;  they do not take
portfolio considerations into account.  In this respect, the most appropriate test of
whether they met these objectives is to focus solely on trading profits.  On the other
hand, it could be claimed that net interest earnings should be taken into account to
put central banks on the same footing as private sector speculators who have to take
portfolio funding decisions into account.
In what follows, we present the figures for profits both including and excluding net
interest income.  It is worth repeating the earlier point, however, that taking account
of net interest income usually works in the central bank's favour.  Contrary to
popular perceptions, therefore, the "trading profits" test is normally a harder one to
pass than one that looks at total profits including net interest earnings.
The effect on net interest income is measured using the difference between the rate
on an Australian 13-week treasury note and a US 3-month treasury bill rate.  These
are reasonable proxies for the interest rates available to the Bank as, at least until
recently, the Bank tended to hold mainly short-term assets.  The interest differential
is applied to the net open currency position held by the Bank as a result of its
foreign exchange operations.
3.2.3 Methodology
We have followed a similar procedure to that used by Murray, Zelmer and
Williamson in their study of profitability for the Canadian experience.  Profits from
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where:
vi  is the addition to an existing US dollar position, with vi > 0 for purchases of US
dollars in a long position and vi < 0 for sales of US dollars in a short position;
mi is the reduction in an existing US dollar position, with  mi > 0 for sales of US
dollars in a long position and  mi < 0 for purchases of US dollars in a short
position;
ei is the exchange rate at which a transaction is made in terms of the number of
Australian dollars per US dollar;
ri and ri
* are the short-term interest rates on Australian dollar and US dollar assets
respectively; and
st is the weighted average exchange rate at which the position is acquired and, for
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The three components on the right hand side of the above formula can be interpreted
as follows:
• the first calculates the realised trading profit during the period;
• the second is a measure of the unrealised trading profit.  It simply revalues any
existing US dollar position using the exchange rate at the end of the period; and
• the third is a measure of net interest earnings from holding a long US dollar
(short Australian dollar) position compared with holding the equivalent in
Australian dollars.15
Note that there is a distinction made between a transaction that adds to an existing
US dollar position, vi, and a transaction that partially reverses a position, mi.  If a
transaction adds to an existing US dollar position, the average exchange rate at
which that position was acquired is recalculated so as to include that new
transaction.  At that point, there is no effect on profits.  It is only when the position
is reversed that trading profits or losses are realised.  Realised profits/losses are
calculated by comparing the exchange rate at which these US dollars are
bought/sold to close out a position with the average exchange rate at which the
position was acquired.  At the end of the period, the unrealised profit or loss on the
remaining open position can be measured by comparing the cost of establishing that
position and the prevailing exchange rate.
A simple example best illustrates.  Suppose the Bank initially purchases foreign
currency and builds up a long US dollar position.  As it continues to buy US dollars,
the average exchange rate at which its long position has been acquired is
recalculated.  (In this case, the average exchange rate is an average purchase price.)
Profits or losses are realised only when the position is reversed by selling
US dollars.  If the exchange rate at which the US dollars are sold is higher than the
average cost at which they were acquired, then there is a realised profit on this
transaction.  If selling of US dollars is sustained, it gradually reverses the long US
dollar position, resulting in profits/losses being realised until the position is fully
closed out.  Once closed out, further sales of US dollars open a short US dollar
position and the average exchange rate at which this position has been acquired is
an average selling price.  Profits/ losses are realised on this short US dollar position
only when US dollars are purchased.  Finally, at the end of the period, unrealised
profits on the outstanding US dollar position are calculated using the end-of-period
exchange rate.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Figure 5 shows the accumulation of total profits and its components - realised
trading profits, the sum of realised and unrealised trading profits and net interest
earnings - between the float and June 1994.16
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In the first few years of the float, realised trading losses were made.  The Australian
dollar depreciated sharply through this period.  The Bank was mainly a seller of
foreign exchange but it did also make some purchases from time to time.  The cost
of these purchases was on average higher than the price at which the Bank was
selling, thus realising trading losses.13  This process continued until end 1986.
Thereafter, as the Australian dollar appreciated, the Bank became a net buyer of
foreign currency and started to close out the net short position built up in the
previous three years.  The price at which the Bank was buying through this period
was below the average price at which the short position had been established, so
profits were realised.  By October 1988, when the US dollar short position was
finally closed out, realised trading profits stood at $A306 million, with a further
$A1.9 billion in net interest earnings.
                                                                                                                                  
13 These trading losses contrast with the accounting profits reported in the Bank's accounts at this
time.  Most of the intervention the Bank undertook immediately post float involved the sale of
foreign exchange which had been acquired prior to the float when the Australian dollar was
stronger and the cost of foreign exchange therefore lower.  The sale of this foreign exchange,
at prices which were above cost, realised profits in the Bank's accounts.  In this study, which
looks only at operations since the float, the cost of foreign exchange acquired before the float
is not taken into account;  it compares receipts from sales of foreign exchange only with the
cost of purchases of foreign exchange since the float.17
Over the next few years, the exchange rate moved within a relatively narrow band
and the Bank built up a small long position.  Realised profits through this period
were relatively modest.  Subsequent sales of foreign currency have once again
opened up a short foreign currency position amounting to $US14.8 billion at June
1994.  This has not had much impact on realised profits; at June 1994, cumulative
realised profits since the float stood at $A382 million.
Realised gains are one component of profits from intervention.  As shown in
Table 1, another component is unrealised gains.  At June 1994, the short foreign
currency position the Bank was holding had resulted in substantial unrealised gains
amounting to $A553 million.  These reflect the difference between the average
exchange rate at which the short position was accumulated (US71.10 cents) and the
exchange rate at end June (US73.04 cents) which is used to revalue the position.
The other component of profits - net interest earnings - have also been substantial in
recent years, and the cumulative total of such earnings since the float is
$A2478 million.  Adding all three components, total profits from intervention since
the float have amounted to $A3414 million.14
Table 1: Reserve Bank Profits from Intervention




Net interest earnings 2478
Total 3414
                                                                                                                                  
14 These profits represent only the revenue earned by the Bank as a result of intervention.  The
Bank also earns regular interest income on its holdings of reserves.  Over the period since the
float, total earnings on reserves have amounted to around $US8 billion.18
5. ALTERNATIVE TESTS OF STABILISING INTERVENTION
5.1 Wonnacott's Criterion
5.1.1 Methodology
Another test of whether exchange rate intervention is stabilising is if it acts to
reduce the variance of the exchange rate around its equilibrium.  This definition,
however, has a major shortcoming in that it requires an exchange rate model to
determine what the equilibrium rate should be, something which continues to elude
the economics profession.
Wonnacott (1982) argued that a more practical definition is that intervention is
stabilising if it reduces the variance of the exchange rate around its trend; this
long-term trend is approximated with a centred moving average.  The deviation of
the exchange rate from its moving average is given by:
DMA






MAk is a centred moving average over k periods.
Wonnacott's test involves measuring whether the direction of intervention is
consistent with pushing the exchange rate back towards its long-run moving
average.  If DMA is greater than zero, so that the exchange rate is above its
long-term trend, intervention that is working in the right direction would involve the
Reserve Bank selling foreign currency to the market.  Similarly, intervention would
be stabilising if the Bank purchased foreign currency from the market when DMA is
negative.  The performance of the monetary authority can be measured by the ratio
of the number of days when intervention was in a stabilising direction to the number
of days when intervention took place.
This success ratio is given by:














di  =  1 if intervention was in the right direction (and zero otherwise); and,
Di  =  1 if intervention took place (and zero otherwise).
Alternatively, the success ratio can be weighted according to the dollar value of
intervention so as to account for the relative intensity of the intervention:
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ni  is the absolute amount of foreign currency purchased or sold in period i.
This pragmatic approach rests upon a number of assumptions.  First, the moving
average is a reasonable proxy for the equilibrium rate, given that this equilibrium
cannot be otherwise quantified.  Large and discrete one-off movements in
fundamentals could require an abrupt shift in the equilibrium rate, something which
cannot be picked up by a simple moving average.  Second, intervention has no
discernible impact on the longer run trend in the exchange rate.  If intervention has
some impact in the longer-term, then the centred moving average exchange rate
would not be an exogenous parameter for the monetary authority, but would be
endogenous to its own policies.  Whilst these assumptions are fairly restrictive, we
would suggest that violations to them have probably not been too great throughout
the period; as a consequence, the success ratios (SR and SR($)) should allow us to
reasonably determine whether intervention was working in the right direction15.
An underlying theme of Wonnacott's test is that intervention is more likely to be
working in the right direction the larger the deviation of the exchange rate from its
moving average.  As a consequence, we have also calculated the success ratios
using a restricted sample that excludes those observations which lie within an x per
cent band of the moving average. Two alternative band widths were chosen:
1½ per cent and 3 per cent either side of the moving average.  This is also more
realistic because it allows the central bank some latitude in assessing where the
                                                                                                                                  
15 The success ratios measure whether the direction of intervention is correct.  They do not test
whether intervention influences the level of the exchange rate.20
longer-term exchange rate is likely to lie.  In addition, because the lag length of the
moving average is also somewhat arbitrary, the success ratios were calculated using
3-month, 6-month, and 12-month moving averages.16
5.1.2 Empirical Results
Table 2 sets out the results for the total post-float period, for the various
combinations of moving averages and band widths.  The way these can be
interpreted is as follows: row 3, for instance, shows results where a three-month
moving average and a 3 per cent band width are used.  The statistics show that over
the whole period the exchange rate deviated from its moving average by more than
3 per cent on 139 days.  On 94 of these days (i.e. 68 per cent) the Bank intervened
in the foreign exchange market.  Of these interventions, 80 per cent (91 per cent
when weighted by the size of intervention) were in a stabilising direction.  The final
column shows that the average daily value of intervention that was in a stabilising
direction was $A66 million.
Success ratios are all in excess of 50 per cent, which indicates that the Bank's
intervention on average was in a stabilising direction on this test.  If intervention had
been random, success ratios would not have been significantly different from
50 per cent.17  The success ratios are significantly higher when weighted according
to the size of intervention, suggesting that large interventions had a greater
propensity to be in the right direction than smaller ones.  Intervention tended to
occur more frequently the further the exchange rate deviated from its moving
average and the success ratios also tended to be higher in these cases.
                                                                                                                                  
16 The tests were performed on series that contain 6 months fewer observations than the original
series in order to allow for the calculation of a 12 month centred moving average.
17 Given the sample size, any value more than 2 per cent away from 50 per cent would be
significantly different from a random outcome.21
Table 2: Moving Average Test for Stabilising Intervention

























All Days 2703 1546 57 55 68 65
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 745 428 57 71 85 66
/DEV/ >3 per cent 139 94 68 80 91 66
6-Month
Moving Average
All Days 2703 1546 57 55 66 64
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 1205 695 58 64 81 63
/DEV/ >3 per cent 419 266 64 76 92 64
12 Month
Moving Average
All Days 2703 1546 57 56 65 63
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 1804 1056 59 55 71 62
/DEV/ >3 per cent 932 598 64 60 80 59
The style of the Bank's intervention has changed during the period since the float.
Up to late 1985, intervention was light.  The average amount dealt on the days when
the Bank intervened was about $A12 million, with the largest being on 8 November
1985, when the Bank purchased $A90 million.  In 1986, the scale of intervention
started to become bigger.  The catalyst for the change in approach was recurring
episodes of extreme foreign exchange market instability.  Around the middle of the
year, as the exchange rate had already fallen a long way and looked undervalued in
relation to economic fundamentals, the Bank intervened heavily to provide a solid
foundation.  On several days, purchases of Australian dollars from the market
approached $A250 million, and for July 1986 as a whole, net purchases amounted
to $A1.2 billion.  Through the second half of the 1980s, the Bank maintained a
frequent presence in the market, intervening on 76 per cent of days.  The average22
size of daily intervention was about $A50 million.  In the 1990s, the frequency of
intervention fell sharply to 26 per cent of days, though the average size increased to
about $A110 million.
It is possible to split the floating rate period into three broad sub-periods,
corresponding to different phases in the Bank's intervention:
• from the float until late 1985, when intervention in the market was very light;
• from late 1985 to early 1991, when the Bank intervened frequently in the
market with moderate volumes; and
• since early 1991, when the Bank has been in the market less frequently but has
dealt in large amounts when needed.
The results for these three sub-periods are shown in Table 3.  These results show
that the success rate of intervention, as measured by SR and SR($), was a little
higher in the second sub-period than in the first period, but increased noticeably in
the latest sub-period when the Bank intervened less frequently but in larger
amounts.  Most success ratios in this last period were above 70 per cent and some
were 100 per cent.  This suggests that the Bank was most successful when it entered
the market less frequently but on a significant scale.23























12 December 1983 to 31 October 1985
3-Month
Moving Average
All Days 527 274 52 54 59 12
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 237 112 47 60 67 15
/DEV/ >3 per cent 64 31 48 74 83 19
6-Month
Moving Average
All Days 527 274 52 53 59 12
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 329 163 50 58 63 13
/DEV/ >3 per cent 148 76 51 66 78 16
12 Month
Moving Average
All Days 527 274 52 51 55 12
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 419 225 54 51 55 12
/DEV/ >3 per cent 289 157 54 53 59 13
1 November 1985 to 31 January 1991
3-Month
Moving Average
All Days 1422 1075 76 53 62 64
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 377 279 74 72 82 68
/DEV/ >3 per cent 75 63 84 83 92 87
6-Month
Moving Average
All Days 1422 1075 76 53 62 62
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 614 463 75 63 75 60
/DEV/ >3 per cent 229 175 76 79 92 70
12 Month
Moving Average
All Days 1422 1075 76 54 63 62
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 951 723 76 55 68 63
/DEV/ >3 per cent 491 392 80 61 77 6224























1 February 1991 to 30 June 1994
3-Month
Moving Average
All Days 754 197 26 71 80 126
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 131 37 28 95 97 162
/DEV/ >3 per cent 0 0 NA NA NA NA
6-Month
Moving Average
All Days 754 197 26 69 79 127
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 262 69 27 84 98 163
/DEV/ >3 per cent 42 15 36 100 100 176
12 Month
Moving Average
All Days 754 197 26 68 72 120
/DEV/ >1½ per cent 434 108 25 74 85 129
/DEV/ >3 per cent 152 49 32 84 97 137
Studies of other major foreign exchange markets have come up with similar
conclusions.  Wonnacott (1982) applied his test to US intervention in
Deutschemarks over the late 1970s,  Mayer and Taguchi (1983) studied intervention
by Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom between 1974 and 1982 while Murray,
Zelmer and Williamson (1990) examined Canadian intervention over the period
1975 to 1988. Their results showed that intervention was helpful, at least on some
simple tests.  For example, the percentage of days when intervention occurred, the
percentage of intervention that was in the right direction and the average value of




A variant to Wonnacott's tests was proposed by Mayer and Taguchi (1983).  They
distinguished two exchange rate zones by fitting a band around the trend in the
exchange rate.  Outside this band, intervention is judged according to Wonnacott's
criterion.  Within the band, however, intervention is judged according to a "leaning
against the wind" criterion, the so-called  LAW criterion.  Under this criterion,
successful interventions push the rate towards the last observed level.  In other
words, the central bank should buy the local currency when it is falling and sell it
when it is rising, regardless of where it stands vis-a-vis the moving average trend.
Mayer and Taguchi argued that this hybrid criterion more accurately reflected
central bank behaviour.18  They suggested that if the exchange rate is a long way
from its equilibrium level but is moving towards it, then Wonnacott's criterion
should prevail.  But as the exchange rate moves closer to its equilibrium level, then
intervention should be assessed according to the LAW criterion.  This is because the
equilibrium level cannot be ascertained exactly, and there is the likelihood of
misjudgment. Moreover, in order to obtain a "smooth landing" in the equilibrium
zone, it might be advisable to lean against the wind to ensure that momentum does
not build up to push the exchange rate through the equilibrium zone.  Figure 6
provides a graphical comparison of these criteria.
                                                                                                                                  
18 Mayer and Taguchi argued that the LAW criterion made little sense applied to all exchange
rate movements because it implied that the authorities always took the view that the prevailing
exchange rate is the best one.  Under this approach, therefore, all exchange rate movements
should be dampened, if not suppressed.26
Figure 6: Stabilisation Criteria



























In testing the Bank's intervention using the hybrid criterion, two bands were chosen
around the long-run trend within which the stabilising impact of intervention was
judged according to the LAW criterion; they are 1½ per cent and 3 per cent on each
side of the moving average.
Table 4 shows results using this criterion for the total post-float period and for the
three sub-periods.  Qualitatively, these results are not very different from using
Wonnacott's criterion:
• success ratios were again well above 50 per cent;
• in all periods, SR($) is higher than SR.  This suggests that intervention for large
amounts was more successful than intervention for small amounts.  Partly this
reflects the fact that large intervention tended to take place when the exchange
rate was a long way from its long-term average (i.e. when the exchange rate
was more likely to be out of line);
• intervention was generally more successful in the second sub-period than in the
early period; and27
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• the success ratio SR($) tends to be highest in the recent sub-period.  In contrast,
however, the success ratio, SR, is little different from the earlier periods and is
well down compared with the success ratios measured using Wonnacott's
criterion.  This suggests that, in this period, the Bank's operations when the
exchange rate was within the band were not characterised by the LAW
criterion.
6. CONCLUSION
Over the floating rate period, the Reserve Bank's foreign exchange operations have
been profitable.  Realised trading profits have amounted to about $A382 million and
unrealised gains were $A553 million at the end of June 1994.  When net interest
income is taken into account, total profits rise to about $A3.4 billion.  While we
acknowledge that there is not always a close link between profits and the
effectiveness of intervention, the existence of profits over a long run of years
suggests that the Bank, on balance, has bought foreign exchange when its price was
low (i.e. the $A exchange rate was high) and sold when its price was high (i.e. the
$A exchange rate was low).  This would indicate that intervention has been in a
stabilising direction.  Alternative tests, such as those proposed by Wonnacott,
provide support for this conclusion.29
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